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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eluith Delgado appeals, pro se, from the summary dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The state charged Delgado with first degree kidnapping and rape. (34689
R., pp. 6, 49-52.)

Delgado pied guilty to the kidnapping charge and the state

agreed to dismiss the rape charge and not proceed with a habitual offender
(34689 R., pp. 10, 120-121.)

The district court sentenced

Delgado to a life sentence with 30 years fixed.

(34689 R., pp. 124-126, 129-

enhancement.

130.) Delgado's judgment of conviction ;:md sentence were affirmed on appeal.
State v. Delgado, Docket No. 34689, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 506 (Idaho
App., June 19, 2009).
Delgado's trial counsel filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the
sentence Delgado received was for "conduct to which [Delgado] did not plead,"
he was sentenced "for a rape charge that had been dismissed," and as a result
the "sentence was excessive." (R., pp.1-3.) The petition included a request for
"the appointment of counsel." (R., p.3.) The state filed an answer asserting the
petition failed to state any grounds upon which relief could be granted, the claims
should have been raised on direct appeal, and the petition contained bare and
conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by admissible evidence.

(R., pp.4-9.)

The state sought dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.6.) The
district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the petition. (R., pp.10-20.) It first

1

considered and denied Delgado's request for counsel in his post-conviction
proceeding finding because Delgado "offered nothing in support of his request for
counsel," "as well as taking note of the fact that Mr. Delgado's Petition was filed
on his behalf by a licensed attorney," Delgado was not entitled to the
appointment of counsel. (R., pp.13-14.) Addressing the claims in the petition for
post-conviction relief, the court found "no genuine issue of material fact exists in
regard to the Petition for Post Conviction Relief since Mr. Delgado only offered
bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence."
(R., p.20.) Delgado's attorney filed a response to the notice of intent to dismiss,
alleging generally that the district court made reference to the dismissed rape
charge when imposing sentence, but failing to supplement the petition with any
admissible evidence. (R., pp.21-24.) The district court dismissed the petition for
post-conviction relief finding Delgado's response to the court's notice of intent to
dismiss "did not include any additional documents or references to the record in
the underlying criminal case." (R., pp.27-31.)
Delgado timely appealed. 1 (R., pp.32-34.)

1

The SAPD was originally appointed to represent Delgado in his appeal. (R.,
pp.39-40.) The SAPD subsequently withdrew from the representation of Delgado
based on its position that "[a]fter a thorough review, each of the three attorneys
was unable to identify a viable issue for appeal." (Affidavit in Support of Motion
For Leave to Withdraw And Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p. 2.)

2

ISSUES
Delgado states the issues on appeal as:
1.
PETITIONER"S [sic] CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH PRIOR
COUNSEL ON PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF VIOLATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER
2.
PETITIONERS [sic) INABILITY & EXPERIANCE [sic) TO FILE A
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF VIOLATE APPEALLANTS
[sic] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
3.
DISTRICT COURTS [sic] DENIAL OF APPOINTMNET OF
COUNSEL VIOLATE [sic] APPELLANTS [sic] RIGHT TO FILE TO
CONFLICT FREE COUNSEL
4.
DISTRICT COURT ERRORED
APPELLANTS [sic] GUil TY PLEA

[sic]

WHEN

ACCEPTING

5.
DISTRICT COURT ERRORED [sic] WHEN USING A DISMISSED
CHARGE AGAINST THE APPELLANT AT SENTENCING
6.
PETITIONERS [sic] SETNENCE WAS IMPOSED IN DIRECT
VIOLATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY LAWS
7.
PETITIONERS [sic] RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL
VIOLATED DUE TO COURT ALLOWING COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW
{Appellant's brief, p.1 {capitalization and lack of punctuation original).)

The state rephrases the issue as follows:
1. Has Delgado failed to show error in the district court's denial of postconviction counsel?
2. Has Delgado failed to show error in the district court's summary
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief?
3. Has Delgado failed to show error in the denial of counsel on appeal?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Delgado Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Denying His Bare Request For The Appointment Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
Delgado asserts on appeal that the court erred in denying the bare

request for post-conviction counsel 2 in his petition.

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

Because Delgado fails to allege any conflict of interest below and the petition, on
its face, did not establish any basis for the appointment of counsel, Delgado's
argument fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for courtappointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho
682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009).

The court's discretion is not

unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
2

The petition for post-conviction relief includes the following unsupported
request: "Petitioner is requesting the appointment of counsel at this time." (R.,
p.3.)
4

appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct.
App. 2009).
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102
P. 3d at 1111 .

C.

Delgado Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To The Appointment
Of Post-Conviction Counsel
A denial of counsel may occur "when the defendant's attorney actively

represented conflicting interests."

Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166-67

(2002). To prevail under this standard a defendant must demonstrate "that a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of [counsel's] representation."
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Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (internal quotations omitted, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980)).

Delgado's only allegation of a conflict is his

position on appeal that "no way would a [sic] attorney file a petition on himself for
ineffective assistance of counsel."

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

Delgado did not

allege a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition.

Nor did he

assert dismissal of counsel or a prima facie claim of a conflict of interest in
response to the state's motion or the trial court's notice of intent to dismiss, much
less support it with admissible evidence. Because the judge presiding over trial
was different than that handling the post-conviction proceedings (see 34689 R.,
pp. 124-126, 129-130 Uudgment of conviction and sentence entered by Judge
McDermott); R., pp.11-20 (notice of intent to dismiss issued by Judge Naftz)), it is
not clear that the trial judge was aware that Delgado's post-conviction action had
been filed by his trial counsel. Delgado has failed to show error in the denial of
the appointment of counsel based on a conflict of interest because he has failed
to establish any such conflict of interest.
As discussed in Section II of this brief, the frivolous nature of the claims in
Delgado's petition for post-conviction relief warrant the denial of the request for
counsel.

The mere involvement of trial counsel in preparing Delgado's post-

conviction pleadings is, under the facts of this case, irrelevant to the district
court's denial of the motion to appoint counsel.
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11.
Delgado Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The district court provided Delgado with the opportunity to respond to its

notice of intent to dismiss and ultimately denied Delgado's petition for postconviction relief on the basis that "he failed to provide to [the] Court any suitable
evidence that he is entitled to post conviction relief on the basis that his sentence
was excessive." (R., p.31.) The district court further found:
Mr. Delgado did not point this Court to the record or other evidence
to substantiate his claims. Mr. Delgado has again offered bare,
conclusory and unverified allegations. As explained previously, the
Petitioner must come forward with "affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such
supporting evidence is not included." Mr. Delgado has failed to
present such evidence or point to the record in the matter and did
not explain why such supporting evidence was not included.
(R., p.31.)

On appeal, Delgado reasserts his original claim that his sentence was
excessive, arguing the court erred in imposing his sentence for kidnapping based
on the underlying facts of the dismissed rape charge. (Appellant's brief, p.8.)
Delgado's arguments on appeal fail.

He has not shown that the district

court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).
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On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.

8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
4903).

J_g.,_ (citing I.C. § 19-

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must accept a

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition. ~ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P .2d 1216, 1220
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

9
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D.

Delgado Has Waived Consideration Of Claims Not Raised In His Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief
Delgado raises two claims for the first time on appeal. He now asserts his

"inability [and] experance [sic] to file a petition for post-conviction relief violated"
his constitutional rights.

(Appellant's brief, p.5 (original capitalization altered).)

Delgado also alleges for the first time on appeal that the district court "errored
[sic] when accepting [his] guilty plea." (Appellant's brief, p.7.)
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a claim not raised before the
district court will not be considered on appeal. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Because these issues were not asserted in
Delgado's petition for post-conviction relief, they are not properly before this
Court on appeal.

E.

Delgado Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In
Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Delgado has failed to establish the district court erred in summarily

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. In both its notice of intent to
dismiss and its order dismissing Delgado's petition for post-conviction relief, the
district court articulates the applicable legal standards and sets forth, in detail,
the reasons Delgado failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on either
of his claims. The state adopts the district court's written opinion as its argument
on appeal, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. Delgado does not
specifically challenge any of the court's findings or legal conclusions (see
generally Appellant's Brief), and he has otherwise failed to establish the district
court erred in dismissing his petition.
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111.
Delgado Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Rights Based On A Denial Of
Counsel On Appeal

In addition to his assertion that the district court erred in imposing an
excessive sentence and failing to provide him with conflict-free counsel, Delgado
alleges this Court violated his right to counsel on appeal by allowing his
appointed counsel to withdraw.

(Appellant's brief, p.10.)

Delgado offered

essentially no argument and his claim is unsupported by legal authority. (see
generally, Appellant's brief, p.10.) "When issues on appeal are not supported by
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered." State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Accordingly, this Court
should decline to consider the merits Delgado's claim that this Court erred in
allowing the SAPD to withdraw from his representation.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Delgado's petition for post-conviction relief.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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APPENDIX A

,yvJ
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF'THE.STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

ELUITH DELGADO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV-2010-4104-PC

ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

This case comes before this Court on a Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed by Eluith
Delgado ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Delgado"). On November 10, 2010, pursuant to Idaho Code
("IC") §19-4906 this Court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (''Notice") Mr. Delgado's petition,
indicating its intent to dismiss each of the claims raised and providing Mr. Delgado the 20 days
required by statute to submit a reply appropriately addressing his arguments and providing
satisfactory evidence that he is entitled to post conviction relief.
On November 30, 2010, this Court granted the Petitioner's request for additional time to
respond to the Notice oflntent to Dismiss. On December 27, 2010, counsel for Mr. Delgado filed a
Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, wherein counsel asserted "that the sentencing court
imposed an excessive sentence." (Resp. to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, Dec. 27, 2010, 3.) Such
response did not include any additional documents or references to the record in the underlying
criminal case.

Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2010-4104-PC
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Further background on this matter was set out in detail in the Notice and is incorporated
herein by reference. 1

1.

Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,903, 174 P.3d 870,873 (2007), the Idaho Supreme
Court set forth this thorough and clear statement of the legal standard that applies to a petition
for post conviction relief:
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State. 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d ·
1278, 1282 (2001). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction
relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the
application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State. 134 Idaho 24, 995 P .2d 794
(2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that
would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for postconviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of
the applicant. LC. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not
included. Id.
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. J.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). On
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and . admissions together with .any affidavits on file and will
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Gilpin-Grubb v. State. 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002), citing LaBelle v. State.
130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct.App.1997). A court is required to accept the
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's
conclusions. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the
alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may
1

The Notice also contains a thorough analysis of the Post-Conviction Relief statute and is not repeated in detail
here.
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief
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2

dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing CoopeF-V. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531
P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the
granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter oflaw. Id.
"On appeal from a summary disposition, [the Court of Appeals] exercises free review.
Yon v. State; 124 Idaho 821, 822, 864 P.2d 659,660 (Ct.App.1993); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho
145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct.App.1988)." Abbottv. State, 129 Idaho 381,382,924 P.2d
1225, 1228 (Idaho Ct.App. 1996).
DISCUSSION

In his Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the Petitioner argues relief is warranted on
the basis "that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence." (Resp. to Notice of Intent to
Dismiss at 3.) Based on that assertion, the Petitioner argues his sentence was "unreasonable" and
thereby "requests that the sentence herein be reduced ...." (Id. at 1, 3.) Specifically, the
Petitioner "asserts that the sentence was excessive in that the Court sentenced the Petitioner as if
he had plead [sic] to all charges. For example, the Court made reference to the charge of rape.
This charge had been dismissed and the Petitioner did not plead to that crime." (Id.)
a.

The Petitioner has failed to present evidence in support of his assertion that his
sentence was excessive and therefore unreasonable.

In his initial Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Delgado asserted the following
grounds for relief;
"a)

[T]he sentence imposed was for conduct to which the Defcmdant did not plead.

3
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b)

That the sentencing Judge sentenced the Defendant for a rape charge that had
been dismissed.

c)

That as a result of the aforementioned the Defendant's sentence was excessive."

(Pet. for Post Conviction Relief, Sept. 29, 2010, 2.) This Court addressed those claims within its
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, finding such claims did not merit post conviction relief because "no
genuine issue of material fact exists ... since Mr. Delgado only offered bare and conclusory
allegations unsubstantiated by any admfssible evidence. Mr. Delgado failed to substantiate his
claims with the requisite affidavits, records or other evidence." (Notice at 11.) The Petitioner
was subsequently instructed to submit a reply "appropriately addressing his arguments in support
of post conviction relief, as well as satisfactorily indicating the reasons he is entitled to such
relief...." (Id.) The Petitioner was informed that unless he ~'allege[d]facts sufficient to raise
the possibility of a valid claim, rather than bare, conclusory allegations," his Petition would be
dismissed. (Id.)
In his Response, Mr. Delgado does not add to his previous claims. Rather than submit any
affidavits or supplementary documents, or point to the record, the Petitioner merely repeats the
allegations asserted in his initial Petition for Post Conviction Relief. For example, Mr. Delgado
reargues his previous claim that his sentence was excessive and thereby unreasonable because he
was "sentenced ... as if he had" pied to "all charges," including a rape charge the Petitioner asserts
had been dismissed prior to the entry of a plea. (Resp. to Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 3.) Mr.
Delgado additionally quoted portions of two Idaho cases in support of his argument that "an
excessive sentence" is "unreasonable." (Id. at 1.) However, while Mr. Delgado argued that
4
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"excessive" sentences may be deemed "unreasonable" under certain circumstances, he failed to
provide to this Court any suitable evidence that he is entitled to post conviction relief on the basis
that his sentence was excessive. Mr. Delgado did not point this Court to the record or other
evidence to substantiate his claims. Mr. Delgado has again offered bare, conclusory and
unverified allegations. As explained previously, the Petitioner must come forward with
"affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such
supporting evidence is not included." Mr. Delgado has failed to present such evidence or point
to the record in the matter and did not explain why such supporting evidence was not included.
Thus, the Petitioner has not proven his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence as
required by the statutes governing post conviction proceedings, and this claim cannot merit the
requested relief. See Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859,243 P.3d 675, 68l(ldaho Ct.App. 2010).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, as well as the reasoning set forth in the Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, this Court hereby DISMISSES the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DA TED this

_f_ day of February, 2011.

~c.~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Mark L. Hiedeman
John C. Souza
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

ELUITH DELGADO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV-2010-4104-PC

NOTICE OF INTENT
TO DISMISS

This case comes before this Court on a Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed by Eluith
Delgado ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Delgado"). Mr. Delgado did not attach any supporting
memorandum or affidavit. The State did not respond. The Petitioner additionally requested the
appointment of counsel.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Petitioner pied guilty to one count Kidnapping in the First Degree, Idaho Code
("IC") § 18-4502, and was sentenced on September 10, 2007, to a 30-year determinate period of
incarceration. That sentence was amended on September 18, 2007, to include.an indeterminate
life sentence. (Pet. for Post Conviction Relief, Sept. 29, 2010, 1-2.)
This Court has carefully reviewed the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Based upon
the following discussion, this Court hereby gives the Petitioner notice of its intent to DISMISS
the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
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ISSUES

l.

Whether to grant the request to appoint counsel.

2.

Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
DISCUSSION

1.

Request for Counsel
a.

Standard of Review

A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is governed by IC
1

§19-4904 , which provides that a court-appointed attorney may be made available to an applicant

who is unable to pay the costs of representation. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102
P .3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies
within the discretion of the district court. Id. (citing Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881,934 P.2d 947
(Idaho CtApp.1997)). When a district court is presented with a request for appointed counsel,
the court will address that request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case. Id.
Pursuant to IC §19-4904, the court "should determine if the petitioner is able to afford
counsel and whether this is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the
petitioner." Id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In making that analysis, the court considers the typical
problems with pro se pleadings, i.e., that such pleadings are often conclusory and incomplete and

1

§ 19-4904. Inability to pay costs.
If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing, witness
fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be made
available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on order of
the district court, by the county in which the application is filed.

2
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that facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner does not
know what such claims may be. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001)).
However, the court must examine the record to determine "whether the facts are such that they
justify the appointment of counsel." Id. at 794, 102 P.3d at 1113. In doing so, every inference
must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented and cannot be expected to
know how to allege the necessary facts. Id. At a minimum, the court "must carefully consider
the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of the petition." Id.

If, after examining a petitioner's claims, the court determines that such claims are ·
frivolous, "it is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so he

has an opportunity to respond." Id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112; see also Newman v. State, 140
Idaho 491,493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Idaho Ct.App. 2004). If the petitioner alleges facts to raise the
possibility of a valid claim, the court should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an
opportunity, working with counsel, to properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Id.; see

also Newman, 140 Idaho at 493, 95 P.3d at 644 (Although the petitioner is not entitled to have
counsel appointed in order to search the record for possible non-frivolous claims, he should be
provided with a meaningful opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request for
court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition where he has alleged facts
supporting some elements of a valid claim.). The court "should provide sufficient information
regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the request with the
necessary additional facts, if they exist." Id.
Thus, a determination regarding a request for the appointment of counsel and a
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
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determination regarding whether a petition for post conviction relief is subject to summary
dismissal are governed by "quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is necessary
in order to gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than that which is necessary to
avoid summary dismissal of a petition." Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22,218 P.3d 1, 2 (Idaho
Ct.App. 2009). As such, ' 1a district court presented with a request for appointed counsel in a
post-conviction action must address that request before ruling on the substantive issues in the
case and errs if it denies a petition on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for
counsel." Id. However,
an order that simultaneously dismisses a post-conviction action and denies a motion for
appointment of counsel will be upheld on appeal if the petitioner received notice of the
fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for
appointment of counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel would properly be
denied - that is, when the petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a
valid claim.

Id. at 4.

b.

Analysis

The Petitioner did not offer any specific facts as to the basis of his request for the
appointment of counsel. Instead, Mr. Delgado simply stated: "Petitioner is requesting the
appointment of counsel at this time." (Pet. for Post Conviction Relief at 3.) The Petitioner failed
to even offer general contentions regarding his inability to represent himself. Furthermore, the
Petition for Post Conviction Relief was filed by "John C. Souza, Attorney for Petitioner."
As the Petitioner has offered nothing in support of his request for counsel, this Court
cannot assess the merits of his claim and therefore must deem Mr. Delgado's motion to be
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition/or Post Conviction Relief
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frivolous on its face. Consequently, after talcing every inference in the Petitioner's favor and
carefully considering the request for counsel, including whether this case appears to pe one in
which counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner, as well talcing note of the fact that Mr.
Delgado's Petition was filed on his behalf by a licensed attorney, this Court must DENY the
request for appointment of counsel.

2.

Petition for Post Conviction Relief
a.

Standard of Review

A petition for post conviction relief is governed by the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), IC §§ 19-4901 - 19-4911. Such a petition initiates a proceeding that
is civil in nature. State v. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho 76, 79, 57 P.3d 787, 790 (2002); State v.
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003). Under IC§ 19-4901(a),
a person who is convicted of or sentenced for a crime may institute a proceeding to secure relief
based on a claim that the conviction was in violation of the state or federal constitutions or the
laws ofldaho, or that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and
heard, that requires the vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interests of justice," among
other grounds.
Pursuant to IC § 19-4901 (b), a petition for post conviction relief is not a substitute for
appeal. A petitioner is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on a direct
appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not have reasonably
been known at the time of the appeal. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 P.3d 924,

5
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925 (2001 ). Similarly, a post conviction petitioner may not re-litigate the same issues that were
already presented in a direct appeal. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho-at 81, 57 P.3d at 792.
IC § 19-4902(a)2 establishes the time limits for the filing of a petition for post conviction
relief, requiring that "[aJn application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." That section of the code
also requires that "[f]acts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of
all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to
affirmatively as true and correct."
IC § 19-4903 3 further demands that a petitioner state and identify in the application for
post conviction relief the grounds upon which the application is based, the specific relief
requested, all previous proceedings in the case and the facts that are within the personal
2

19-4902. Commencement of proceedings-Verificatioo-Filiog-Service--DNA testing
(a) A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court
in which the conviction took place.' An application may be filed at any time within one (I) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination ofan appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an
appeal, whichever is later. Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of all
documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affinnatively as true and correct.
The supreme court may prescribe the form of the application and verification. The clerk shall docket the application
upon its receipt and promptly bring it to the attention of the court and deliver a copy to the prosecuting attorney.
3

§ 19-4903. Application-Contents
The application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted, give the date of the entry of the
judgment and sentence complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based, and
clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from
other allegations of facts and shall be verified as provided in section 19-4902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are not attached.
The application shall identify all previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the
applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and discussion of authorities are
unnecessary.
6
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knowledge of the petitioner. That section also requires that a petitioner attach affidavits, reco~s
and other evidence supporting the allegations, or recite why such evidence is not attached to the
application. IC§ 19-4903 has been interpreted to require that an application "must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application shall be
subject to dismissal," i.e., the application must contain more facts than the "short and plain
statement of the claim" that is required of the usual civil complaint by Rule 8(a)(l) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP"). Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.2d 626, 628:29 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003).
IC § 19-4906(b) permits a court to dismiss the action-if-the court is satisfied, based on the
record, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings. That section also requires that the court, as a prerequisite to dismissal, give the
petitioner notice of intent to dismiss and provide twenty days during which the petitioner may
respond. However, under IC§ 19-4906(c)4 the court may summarily dispose of the petition
upon the motion of either of the parties when, based on the record, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No notice of intent
to dismiss is required for a summary disposition under that section. Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319, 321-22, 900 P.2d 795, 797-98 (1995). Summary dismissal under either section is the
procedural equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741
4

IC § 19-4906(c). The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together
with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
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P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct.App. 1994). Thus,
in determining whether to summarily dismiss, a court must view the facts in a light most
favorable to the petitioner and determine whether those facts would entitle the petitioner to relief
if accepted as true. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 (2001); Goodwin, 138
Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 806, 69 P.3d at 1067. If the court finds that
the accepted facts entitle the petitioner to relief, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing.
LePage, 138 Idaho at 806-07, 69 P.3d at 1067-68.

Summary dismissal of an application may be appropriate, even if the State does not
controvert the petitioner's facts, because "the court is not required to accept either the applicant's
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions
oflaw." Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 807, 69 P.3d at 1068.
Further, a petition is "subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears
the burden of proof." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 604, 21 P.2d at 926.
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163
(Ct.App.1991)~ Hoover v. State. 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988);
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary
dismissal of an application· for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even
where the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not
required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State. 125 Idaho
644. 647. 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994): Baruth v. Gardner. 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715
P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.1986).
.
8
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Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 667-68, 152 P.3d 25, 28-29 (Idaho Ct.App. 2007). The

court in that case further explained the procedure for summary dismissal when the state has not
provided notice of the grounds for dismissal.
[I]f the state's motion fails to give notice of the grounds, the court may grant summary
dismissal only if the court first gives the applicant twenty days' notice of intent to dismiss
and the grounds therefore, pursuant to Section 19-4906(b). Flores v. State. 128 Idaho
476, 478, 915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct.App.1996). This procedure is necessary so that the
applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue of fact.
Id.
Id. at 668, 152 P.3d at 29. "On appeal from a summary disposition, [the Court of Appeals]

exercises free review. Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821,822,864 P.2d 659,660 (Ct.App.1993);
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct.App.1988)." Abbottv. State, 129

Idaho 381,382, 924 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Idaho Ct.App. 1996).
b.

Analysis

Mr. Delgado sets forth the following three grounds in support of his Petition for Post
Conviction Relief:
a)

That the sentence imposed was for conduct to which the Defendant did not plead.

b)

That the sentencing Judge sentenced the Defendant for a rape charge that had
been dismissed.

c)

That as a result of the aforementioned the Defendant's sentence was excessive.

(Pet. for Post Conviction Relief at 2.) The Petitioner offered no argument in support of these
'

allegations and did not point to the underlying record. The Petitioner further failed to provide
this Court with any affidavits or a supporting brief.
9
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As set forth in detail previously, the applicant in a post conviction proceeding must prove
the allegations upon which the request for relief is based by a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, an application for post conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its
allegations must be attached or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not
included with the application. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4903 (2009). This "court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere concluso_ry allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the applicant's conclusions oflaw." Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861,861,979 P.2d 1219,
1219 (Idaho Ct.App. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
Mr. Delgado did not offer any affidavits or any other evidence or point to the record in
the underlying case in support of his application. In fact, the Petitioner did not even offer any
specifics or argument regarding his three grounds in support of post conviction relief. Mr.
Delgado did not state why such supporting evidence was not included with his application. As
such, the Petitioner's contentions are no more than conclusory allegations, which this Court is
not required to accept. Therefore, as Mr. Delgado has only offered bare and conclusory
allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, he has not satisfied his burden pursuant
to the statutes governing post conviction proceedings, and his claim must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION

This Court DENIES the Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel because this
Court finds the Petitioner's claims are without merit.

10
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Furthermore, no genuine issue of material fact exists in regard to the Petition for Post
Conviction Relief since Mr. Delgado only offered bare and conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence. Mr. Delgado failed to substantiate his claims with
the requisite affidavits, records or other evidence. As such, these claims cannot merit post
conviction relief.
Therefore, based on the foregoing and in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-4906, this
Court hereby indicates its intention to dismiss the Petitioner's request for post conviction relief.
The Petitioner must submit a suitable reply, appropriately addressing his arguments in support of
post conviction relief, as well as satisfactorily indicating the reasons he is entitled to such relief,
within twenty (20) days from the date of the entry of this Notice of Intent to Dismiss. If, after
submitting additional information, the Petitioner alleges/acts sufficient to raise the possibility of
a valid claim, rather than bare, conclusory allegations, this Court will again consider whether the
claims merit an evidentiary hearing. However, if the Petitioner fails to reply within the allotted
time frame, this matter will be dismissed without further action of this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATEDthis

i

dayofNovember,2010.

~c.~
ROBERTc.N
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Mark L. Hiedeman
John C. Souza
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